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ABSTRACT
A group of former and current football and men’s
basketball players, led by ex-UCLA basketball star Edward
O’Bannon, brought an antitrust suit against the NCAA in
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California. Their goal was to obtain an injunction ending
the NCAA’s rules preventing players from being paid for
the use of their names, images, or likenesses. Relying in
large part on a 1984 Supreme Court case, NCAA v. Board
of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, the NCAA
claimed that there are specific procompetitive justifications
for the restrictions, namely, amateurism and competitive
balance. The district court found that the alleged
procompetitive justifications did not excuse the challenged
restraints, a decision that the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit recently upheld. Such rulings are
contradictory to the fundamental principles of antitrust law
and have the potential to eliminate the college sports
product entirely.
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INTRODUCTION
Pay-for-play has long been an expression common to amateur
sports. Typically, this phrase has described the athlete’s burden,
whether it be a high school student paying a try-out fee or a “walkon” college student-athlete paying tuition. But, as the industry of
college sports has grown, so too has the cry for compensating
student-athletes for their role in the economic success. As such, the
pay-for-play responsibility appears to be shifting to colleges and
universities. This shift has resulted in an outbreak of antitrust
action against the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(“NCAA” or the “Association”), headlined by the recent
O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Association case, which
challenged the restrictions on paying student-athletes for the use of
their names, images, and likenesses. More recently, Jenkins v.
National Collegiate Athletics Association was filed, challenging all
restrictions on paying student-athletes. This Article will consider
the NCAA’s arguments in O’Bannon and will identify the district
court and the Ninth Circuit’s errors in analyzing those arguments.
To illustrate the errors of the courts’ analysis, this Article will
conclude with an evaluation of O’Bannon’s potential impact on the
upcoming Jenkins suit.
I. BASICS OF ANTITRUST LAW
Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that no person may
undertake a “contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade.”1 Corporations, in fact, frequently cooperate with one
another, and most of their cooperation is legal. Understanding
when such cooperation is illegal requires a specific analysis,
starting with the language of Section 1. While the statutory
language initially appeared to the federal courts to bar every
contract that restrained trade, the Supreme Court ultimately held it
to prohibit only those restraints of trade that are unreasonable. 2 In
1

15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 2015).
Bd. of Trade of City of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 239, 241
(1918). See also Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (“Congress
intended to outlaw only unreasonable restraints[.]”).
2
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implementing a broad standard of “reasonableness,” the Court
developed a distinction between two kinds of Section 1 cases: (1)
conduct that is “per se illegal” and (2) conduct that is subject to the
“rule of reason.”3
There are certain agreements that, because of their injurious
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue, are
presumed to be per se unreasonable and illegal without inquiry into
specific harm or the business rationale for their use.4 Under current
law, these consist of so-called “naked” agreements among
competitors to eliminate competition.5 These include: (1)
horizontal price-fixing, (2) horizontal market or customer
allocation, and (3) horizontal concerted refusal to deal (boycotts).6
If the agreement is not per se illegal, it is traditionally subject to
rule of reason analysis.7 Such analysis takes into account a variety
of factors in considering whether the questioned practice imposes
an unreasonable restraint on competition.8 In recent years, the
Supreme Court and the Federal Trade Commission have suggested
that, in some cases, the distinction may not always be “either/or”
between the rule of reason and the per se rule, but may involve a
more nuanced analysis into a restraint’s competitive effects known
as a “quick-look” inquiry.9
Antitrust law also distinguishes between different kinds of
conduct, depending on the position of the firms involved in the
chain of distribution. Two parties are horizontal competitors if they
compete on the same level of the market, for example, distribution,
manufacturing, or sales.10 Vertical arrangements occur if one of the
parties is an “upstream” participant in the market, potentially
relying on the other to distribute the goods.11 Section 1 of the
3

Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977).
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
5
Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enter., 776 F.2d 185, 188 (7th Cir. 1985).
6
N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5.
7
See generally Cont’l T.V., Inc., 433 U.S. at 58.
8
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997).
9
See, e.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 89 (1984).
10
1 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS
83 (7th ed. 2012).
11
Id. at 137.
4
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Sherman Act applies to both horizontal and vertical agreements,
but treats horizontal agreements much more harshly.12 The reason
for the distinction is simple: Head-to-head competitors ordinarily
have little reason to legitimately cooperate or agree with one
another. By contrast, vertical arrangements are essential for
providing products to consumers.13
To state a claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, a plaintiff
must allege “(1) that there was a contract, combination, or
conspiracy; (2) that the agreement unreasonably restrained trade
under either a per se rule of illegality or a rule of reason analysis;
and (3) that the restraint affected interstate commerce.”14 Once
anticompetitive effects are ascertained, the burden shifts to the
defendant to produce evidence of procompetitive justifications or
effects.15 Procompetitive effects include “efficiency gains, the
development or improvement of products, and other benefits to
consumers and society.”16 If a procompetitive effect is established,
the plaintiff must show a less restrictive alternative to the
challenged restraints that outweighs the procompetitive
justification.17
II. NCAA V. BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA
NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma is
frequently recognized as the governing law for challenges to
restraints regarding amateurism in collegiate sports.18 In Board of
12

Id. at 136.
Id.
14
Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation
omitted).
15
Id. at 1063.
16
California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1160 (9th Cir.
2011).
17
See Sullivan v. Nat’l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1103 (1st Cir. 1994)
(Any claimed benefit of the restraint “cannot outweigh its harm to competition,
if a reasonable, less restrictive alternative to the policy exists that would provide
the same benefits as the current restraint.”).
18
See Brief for the National Collegiate Athletic Association at 25,
O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015)
(No. 14–16601), ECF No. 13.
13
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Regents, two universities challenged an NCAA limitation on the
number of football games schools could license for telecast.19 The
Court made clear that NCAA rules designed for preserving
amateurism, including the rules prohibiting the compensation of
student-athletes, are valid as a matter of law under the Sherman
Act. The Court explained that collegiate athletics form “an industry
in which horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the
product is to be available at all.”20 Though these rules will likely
“restrain the manner in which institutions compete,” such a league
would be impossible “if there were no rules on which the
competitors agreed to create and define the competition to be
marketed.”21 The Court recognized that NCAA sports have an
identifiable academic tradition that differentiates them from
professional sports to which they might otherwise be compared.22
In order to “preserve the character and quality of the ‘product,’”
the NCAA must adopt certain rules, such as “athletes must not be
paid, must be required to attend class, and the like.”23 Board of
Regents has since been reinforced by American Needle v. National
Football League, which recognized that rules which define the
essential character and quality of a product are procompetitive as a
matter of law.24
III. O’BANNON BACKGROUND
The plaintiffs in O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic
Association, a group of twenty current and former college studentathletes, brought an antitrust class action suit against the NCAA in
2009.25 Plaintiffs played either Division I men’s basketball or
football between 1956 and the present.26 They represent a certified
19

Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85, 89 (1984).
20
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 100–01.
21
Id. at 101.
22
Id. at 101–02.
23
Id. at 102.
24
Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 203 (2010).
25
O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 965
(N.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
26
Id. at 965.
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class of all current and former student-athletes who “compete on,
or competed on, an NCAA Division I . . . men’s basketball [or] . . .
football team and whose images, likenesses and/or names may be,
or have been, included . . . in game footage or in videogames
licensed or sold by Defendants, their co-conspirators, or their
licensees.”27 Named plaintiff, Edward O’Bannon, was a studentathlete at the University of California, Los Angeles (“UCLA”)
from 1991 to 1995.28 He played on UCLA’s Division I men’s
basketball team pursuant to the rules and regulations of the
NCAA.29
The NCAA is a membership-driven organization dedicated to
protecting the well-being of student-athletes and equipping them
with the skills to succeed both academically and athletically.30
Founded in 1905, the Association includes roughly 350 Division I
colleges and universities who, together, field more than 6000
athletic teams and 17,000 student-athletes.31 Today, the
Association issues and enforces rules focused on promoting a
balanced academic, social, and athletic experience for studentathletes.32 To that end, member colleges and universities have
agreed on several basic principles for Division I athletics.33 These
include: (1) Student-athletes shall be amateurs in intercollegiate
sports, and their participation should be motivated primarily by
education and by the physical, mental, and social benefits to be
derived, and (2) Student-athletes must be students whose athletic
activities are conducted as an integral part of their educational
experiences.34 In accordance with these principles, the NCAA has
allowed its member schools to provide student-athletes with
27

Id.
Order on NCAA’s and CLC’s Motion to Dismiss at 2, O’Bannon, 7 F.
Supp. 3d 955 (No. C 09–3329 CW), ECF No. 142.
29
Id.
30
About the NCAA, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about (last visited Sept.
23, 2015).
31
Id.
32
NCAA Core Values, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/ncaa-core-values
(last visited Sept. 23, 2015).
33
Defendant NCAA’s Trial Brief at 1, O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (No. C 09–3329 CW), ECF No. 184.
34
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
28

162

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 11:3

scholarships for full “grant in aid,” defined as the total cost of
tuition, fees, room and board, and required books.35
A. O’Bannon Allegations
The O’Bannon Complaint alleged that the NCAA’s rules
restricting compensation for the use of the names, images, and
likenesses of men’s football and basketball players are illegal
restraints of trade in violation of the Sherman Act.36 Specifically,
plaintiffs “challenge[d] the set of rules that bar student-athletes
from receiving a share of the revenue that the NCAA and its
member schools earn from the sale of licenses to use the studentathletes’ names, images, and likenesses in videogames, live game
telecasts, and other footage.”37 O’Bannon claimed that such
regulations allow the NCAA to enter into licensing agreements to
distribute student-athlete images which the student-athletes did not
consent to, nor receive compensation for.38 These actions allegedly
exclude student-athletes from the collegiate licensing market and
fix the price of student-athlete images at “zero.”39 O’Bannon
claimed that this conduct constitutes illegal price-fixing and a
group boycott, violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act.40 As such,
O’Bannon requested, among other things, that the court enjoin the
NCAA from enforcing any releases that purport to have caused any
member of the class to relinquish rights to compensation for use of
their names, images, and likenesses; and prevent any such
agreements between the NCAA and its student-athletes in the
future.41

35

O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1054
(2015).
36
Specifically, NCAA Bylaw Article 12.5.1.1 and Form 08-3a. See Order
on NCAA’s and CLC’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 28, at 2–3; O’Bannon, 7
F. Supp. 3d at 963.
37
O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 963.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Class Action Complaint at 68–69, O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (No. C
09–3329 CW), ECF No. 1.
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A two-week trial was held in June of 2014.42 The court found
that the challenged rules unreasonably restrained trade and could
not be justified by the NCAA’s procompetitive arguments.43 The
Ninth Circuit has since upheld much of the district court’s holding
and its rationale.44
B. The NCAA’s Procompetitive Justifications and the Courts’
Findings
Defendant NCAA argued that the challenged restraints create a
unique product and promote consumer demand for college
athletics.45 As a result, the restraints expand consumer choice and
encourage interbrand competition, the primary concerns of
antitrust law.46 The NCAA claimed its product is defined by the
amateur status of the student-athletes and its competitive balance.47
As such, both of these elements were presented as procompetitive
justifications for the challenged restraints.48
1. Amateurism
The NCAA claimed that the public watches college sports
because they believe that the student-athletes are playing “for the
love of the game and for the value and opportunities available to
them from a college education.”49 To show that amateurism is an
essential aspect of its product, the NCAA pointed to its long
history of rules enforcing this tradition.50 Additionally, the NCAA
presented a number of consumer opinion surveys and testimony

42

O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 963.
Id.
44
See generally O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d
1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
45
O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 973.
46
Defendant NCAA’s Post-Trial Brief at 19, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (No. C 09–
3329 CW), ECF No. 279.
47
O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 973.
48
Id.
49
Defendant NCAA’s Post-Trial Brief, supra note 46, at 19.
50
Id.
43
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from various witnesses to support its argument.51 These surveys,
which asked fans of Division I football and basketball how they
would react to paying student-athletes, suggested that fans were
generally opposed to a pay-for-play system.52 Finally, the NCAA
cited the Supreme Court decision in the Board of Regents case to
support its amateurism justification.53
Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that
the challenged restraints do promote amateurism and have some
procompetitive value, but found that this did not justify the
challenged restraints.54 Initially, the district court reasoned that the
historical evidence regarding the tradition of amateurism
demonstrated an inconsistent approach to enforcement.55 The court
noted that in 1916, the NCAA adopted a rule stating that an
amateur was “one who participates in competitive physical sports
only for pleasure and the physical, mental, moral, and social
benefits directly derived therefrom.”56 Currently, the NCAA’s
amateurism provision states that student-athletes “shall be
amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their participation should
be motivated primarily by education and by the physical, mental
and social benefits to be derived.”57 The court pointed out that
these definitions are in stark contrast to each other, as evidenced by
the focus on education in the current rule, which was not
specifically mentioned in the 1916 definition.58 Rather than
exhibiting the NCAA’s “adherence to a set of core principles, this
history documents how malleable the NCAA’s definition of
amateurism has been.”59 The court thus found the historical
evidence presented by the NCAA to be unpersuasive.60 The Ninth
Circuit took a slightly different approach than the district court,
51

O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 999.
Id. at 975.
53
Id. at 999.
54
O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1072–73,
1079 (9th Cir. 2015); O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1001.
55
O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 973.
56
Id. at 974.
57
Id. at 974–75.
58
Id. at 975.
59
Id. at 1000.
60
Id.
52
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finding that “[e]ven if the NCAA’s concept of amateurism had
been perfectly coherent and consistent” throughout its history, it
still did not justify the challenged restraints.61
Turning to the consumer opinion surveys, the district court
found these to contain several methodological flaws.62
Specifically, the surveys did not ask the consumers about the
particular restraints challenged in this case.63 Furthermore, the
plaintiff presented several studies to counter the NCAA surveys.64
After considering this evidence, the court found that the
amateurism rules play only “a limited role in driving consumer
demand for [Division I] football and . . . basketball-related
products.”65 The Ninth Circuit did not address the consumer
surveys.
Finally, the NCAA argued that the Supreme Court made clear
in Board of Regents that the NCAA’s restraints designed for
preserving amateurism, including the rules prohibiting the
compensation of student-athletes, are valid as a matter of law
under the Sherman Act.66 In addressing this argument, both the
district court and the Ninth Circuit dismissed the relevant portions
of the case as dicta, noting that “Board of Regents addressed limits
on television broadcasting, not payments to student-athletes.”67
Furthermore, the district court stated the industry of college sports
has changed a great deal in the thirty years since the Board of
Regents ruling.68

61

O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1073 (9th
Cir. 2015).
62
O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1000.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 1001.
66
Brief for the National Collegiate Athletic Association, supra note 18, at
22.
67
O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 999; O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1063 (9th Cir. 2015).
68
O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1000.
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2. Competitive Balance
The NCAA also claimed that the challenged restraints protect
the competitive balance in college athletics.69 The NCAA believes
such competitive balance is essential to sustaining consumer
demand for the product.70 The Association claimed that the
“Supreme Court has expressly noted that the NCAA’s restrictions
. . . are tailored to the goal of competitive balance and are clearly
sufficient to preserve competitive balance.”71 The NCAA also
noted that the expert witnesses on both sides testified that if
student-athletes were able to receive compensation from colleges
for their names, images, and likenesses, recruits would be more
likely to attend schools that would offer the greatest amount of
money.72 The NCAA argued that this would shift the distribution
of talent towards wealthier colleges, likely resulting in their greater
success.73 This shift in competitive balance would negatively affect
the demand for college sports.74
The district court found the NCAA’s argument unpersuasive.75
The court cited several sports economists who all concluded that
“the rules have no discernible effect on the level of competitive
balance.”76 This appeared to the court to be a logical conclusion
given the money currently spent on other elements of recruiting.77
For example, the schools the NCAA pointed to as the wealthy—
who would seemingly be able to recruit the most talented players
should the restraints be lifted—simply spend that money on
69

Id. at 978.
Id.
71
Defendant NCAA’s Post-Trial Brief, supra note 46, at 26 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 978. The NCAA focused the majority of its
appellate argument on its amateurism justification. As such, the Ninth Circuit
“accept[ed] the district court’s factual findings that the compensation rules do
not promote competitive balance” without consideration of the NCAA’s original
arguments or those made in its post-trial brief. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1072 (9th Cir. 2015).
76
O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 978.
77
Id.
70

2015]

THROWING THE FLAG ON PAY-FOR-PLAY

167

training facilities and coaching.78 The court reasoned that the “fact
that high-revenue schools are able to spend freely in these other
areas cancels out whatever leveling effect the restrictions on
student-athlete pay might otherwise have.”79 Most importantly, the
court found that even if the NCAA had sufficiently connected the
current rules and competitive balance, it had not shown that a
change in competitive balance would negatively affect consumer
demand.80
C. O’Bannon Ruling
Though the district court found that neither of these
justifications was sufficient to justify the challenged restraints, it
did hold that the amateurism argument plays a limited role in
driving consumer demand and thus has a minimal procompetitive
effect.81 Under the rule of reason, the next step would be a showing
by the plaintiff of a less restrictive alternative to the challenged
restraints that outweighs the procompetitive justification.82
O’Bannon presented such an alternative, which was adopted by the
district court.83 The court ruled that the member-schools must raise
the restrictive cap on payments to student athletes to the full cost of
attendance.84 Full cost of attendance is defined as the full “grant in
aid” plus non-required books, supplies, transportation, and other
living expenses.85 The court also found that colleges may allow for
the creation of a trust for each student-athlete that can hold up to
$5,000 per year of attendance, payable when the student-athlete
78

Id.
Id. at 978–79.
80
Id. at 979.
81
Id. at 1001.
82
Brief for Antitrust Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant at 6,
O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015)
(No. 14–16601), ECF No. 17. See also Sullivan v. Nat’l Football League, 34
F.3d 1091, 1103 (1st Cir. 1994) (Any claimed benefit of the restraint “cannot
outweigh its harm to competition, if a reasonable, less restrictive alternative to
the policy exists that would provide the same benefits as the current restraint.”).
83
O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 983.
84
Id. at 1008.
85
O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1054 n.3.
79
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leaves school or is no longer eligible to play.86 The court noted that
the $5,000 cap on additional compensation is “comparable to the
amount of money that the NCAA permits student-athletes to
receive if they qualify for a Pell grant.”87
The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, finding that “the NCAA’s
rules have been more restrictive than necessary to maintain its
tradition of amateurism in support of the college sports market.”88
It continued by mandating “that the NCAA permit its schools to
provide up to the [full] cost of attendance to their student
athletes.”89 But, the court vacated the district court’s judgment
requiring the NCAA to allow its member schools to pay studentathletes up to $5000 per year in additional compensation, stating
that the “difference between offering student-athletes educationrelated compensation and offering them cash sums . . . is a
quantum leap.”90
IV. ANALYSIS
This section will identify the courts’ errors in analyzing the
NCAA’s amateurism and competitive balance arguments against
compensating student-athletes for the use of their names, images,
and likenesses. To best illustrate the magnitude of such errors, this
section will then identify the disastrous results the ruling would
trigger if the courts’ rationale were followed in the upcoming
Jenkins suit.
A. The Challenged Restraints Are Necessary To Maintain
Amateurism and Must Be Upheld
In review, the district court held that the amateurism argument,
though procompetitive, was insufficient to justify the challenged
86

Id.
O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1008.
88
O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1079. Again, because the NCAA focused its
appellate argument on its amateurism justification, the Ninth Circuit did not
analyze the NCAA’s earlier competitive balance arguments. Id. at 1072.
89
O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1079.
90
Id. at 1078–79.
87
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restraints for three reasons: (1) the historical definitions of
amateurism are inconsistent, (2) the amateurism rules play only “a
limited role in driving consumer demand for [Division 1] football
and . . . basketball-related products,” and (3) the Board of Regents
case did not have precedential value. The Ninth Circuit came to the
same finding, albeit through a different analysis of the historical
definitions of amateurism and the Board of Regents case.
1. The O’Bannon Amateurism Ruling is a Frivolous “Tweak” of a
Reasonable Restraint
The district court’s finding that the historical definitions of
amateurism are too inconsistent to justify the restraints can be
challenged on several fronts. First, while the NCAA’s definition
has changed many times since 1905, the NCAA has consistently
observed its central amateurism principle: Student-athletes should
not be paid for their performance.91 Second, it is highly unrealistic
to expect an association with hundreds of members and thousands
of students to maintain a perfectly static definition of amateurism
for over 100 years. To suggest that the changes in phrasing reflects
a lack of commitment to the NCAA’s central principle is
inconsiderate of the inevitable transformation and progression that
an organization goes through over a long period of time, while still
being able to maintain its core principle.92
The Ninth Circuit took the position that even if the amateurism
definition was consistent, the NCAA cannot justify the challenged
restraints “simply by pointing out that it has adhered to those rules
for a long time.”93 The court agreed with the district court’s finding
that there is a procompetitive effect to the NCAA’s commitment to
amateurism, but found that the current restraints have “been more
restrictive than necessary to maintain its tradition.”94 As such, the
91

52.

92

Brief for the National Collegiate Athletic Association, supra note 18, at

The Ninth Circuit even acknowledged that the district court “probably
underestimated the NCAA’s commitment to amateurism.” O’Bannon, 802 F.3d
at 1073.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 1079.
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court mandated that the NCAA permit its “members to give
scholarship up to the full cost of attendance.”95
In addressing the Ninth Circuit’s rationale, it is worth noting
that the NCAA’s purpose in pointing to its various definitions of
amateurism was not just to highlight the consistency of the
definitions, but also to emphasize amateurism’s essential nature to
the college athletic product—an argument supported by a variety
of consumer opinion surveys. Furthermore, although the court’s
ruling keeps student-athlete compensation within the NCAA’s
standards of the amateurism definition, there are a host of
problems with its justification for the ruling. The court
acknowledged that the challenged restraints serve a procompetitive
purpose: Promoting amateurism.96 When a restraint is reasonably
necessary to promote a procompetitive business purpose, it should
be upheld.97 As the Ninth Circuit itself admits, “it is not . . . [the]
court’s function to tweak every market restraint that the court
believes could be improved.”98 In finding that the procompetitive
effect does not justify the challenged restraints, the court is making
a judgment call, second-guessing the rationale of the NCAA as to
the most efficient way of maintaining its tradition of amateurism.
The court justifies its “tweak” by claiming that the challenged
restraint is “patently and inexplicably stricter than is necessary to
accomplish all of its procompetitive objectives.”99 Not only is such
description a gross overstatement, but it opens the door for further
litigation. It seems disingenuous to describe a restraint as “patently
and inexplicably stricter than is necessary,” but find that it need
95

Id. at 1053.
Id. at 1073.
97
See Am. Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 1249–50
(3d Cir. 1975) (noting its objection to a court “second-guessing business
judgments as to what arrangements would or would not provide ‘adequate’
protection for legitimate commercial interests”); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v.
Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 227–28 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“We do not
believe . . . the Supreme Court intended that lower courts should calibrate
degrees of reasonable necessity. That would make the lawfulness of conduct
turn upon judgments of degrees of efficiency. There is no reason in logic why
the question of degree should be important.”).
98
O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1075.
99
Id.
96
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only be changed by a mere eleven percent, the difference between
cost of attendance and full grant in aid.100 This trivial difference
not only shows that the ruling is frivolous, but it also sets the tone
for future plaintiffs to make small additions to this cap, without
needing to prove that a substantial change is warranted. The court
acknowledges this point, admitting that there is “little doubt that
plaintiffs will continue to challenge the arbitrary limit imposed . . .
until they have captured the full value of their [name, image, and
likeness].”101

100

Average full grant-in-aid for an in-state undergraduate at a Pac-12
school for the 2015–16 academic year is $31,053. To raise that amount to the
full cost-of-attendance, the average increase in cost would be $3,542, or 11%.
This number is as low as 2% at schools such as University of Southern
California. See Stephanie Loh, Pac-12, MWC cost of attendance estimate, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/
news/2015/mar/03/aztecs-football-penn-state-cost-of-attendance-5000/; Tuition
& Fees, WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY, https://admission.wsu.edu/tuitioncosts/tuition-break-down/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2015); Cost of Attendance,
UNIVERSITY OF OREGON, https://financialaid.uoregon.edu/cost_of_attendance
(last visited Dec. 15, 2015); 2015-2016 Estimated Cost of Attendance, THE
UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA, http://financialaid.arizona.edu/undergraduate/
estimated-cost-attendance (last visited Dec. 15, 2015); Cost of Attendance,
OREGON
STATE
UNIVERSITY,
http://financialaid.oregonstate.edu/
review_costofattendance (last visited Dec. 15, 2015); Cost of Attendance,
BERKELEY UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, http://admissions.berkeley.edu/
costofattendance (last visited Dec. 15, 2015); How Much Will My Education
Cost?, USC UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, http://www.usc.edu/
admission/fa/undergraduates/admitted/how-much-will-my-education-cost.html
(last visited Dec. 15, 2015); Fees, Tuition, and Estimated Student Budget,
UCLA, https://www.admissions.ucla.edu/prospect/budget.htm (last visited Dec.
15, 2015); The Student Budget, STANFORD, http://financialaid.stanford.edu/
undergrad/budget/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2015); In-State Undergraduate
Estimated
Costs,
UNIVERSITY
OF
COLORADO
BOULDER,
https://bursar.colorado.edu/tuition-fees/estimated-cost-of-attendance/in-stateundergraduate-estimated-costs/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2015); Undergraduate cost
of attendance, ASU, https://students.asu.edu/financialaid/coa/undergraduate (last
visited Dec. 15, 2015); Total Cost of Attendance, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON,
https://admit.washington.edu/Paying/Cost (last visited Dec. 15, 2015); Cost, THE
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, http://admissions.utah.edu/cost/ (last visited Dec. 15,
2015).
101
O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1079.
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2. The Challenged Restraints Play a Significant Role In Driving
Consumer Demand Because They Create a Unique Product
After considering the consumer surveys, the district court
found that the challenged restraints play only a limited role in
driving consumer demand. This is a far too narrow view of the
effect of the regulations. The challenged restraints drive consumer
demand by distinguishing college sports from professional sports,
which “enables a product to be marketed which might otherwise be
unavailable.”102 The result is wider consumer choice, which is a
traditional procompetitive benefit in antitrust law. Thus, the
restraints play an essential role in driving consumer demand
because they define a unique product.
3. The NCAA Restraints Are Valid as a Matter of Law Under
Board of Regents
The district court and the Ninth Circuit concluded that, because
the Board of Regents case only “addressed limits on television
broadcasting, not payments to student-athletes,” the portions of the
case that seemingly pertain to this case are simply dicta.103 Similar
to the district court’s ruling on the role of the restraints in driving
demand, this view is far too narrow. The Supreme Court’s analysis
of the rules against compensation of student-athletes was integral
to the analytical framework the Court adopted. The Court itself
stated that the challenged restraint in Board of Regents was
unlawful because it did “not . . . fit into the same mold as do rules
defining the . . . eligibility of participants.”104 Thus, the eligibility
of student-athletes was a substantial consideration in the Board of
Regents analysis, just as it is in the amateurism analysis here.
102

Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85, 102 (1984).
103
O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 999
(N.D. Cal. 2014). See also O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1062 (“The Board of Regents
Court certainly discussed the NCAA’s amateurism rules at great length, but it
did not do so in order to pass upon the rules’ merits, given that they were not
before the Court.”).
104
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 118.
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Even if the court determines that the amateurism analysis in Board
of Regents is dicta, such analysis should be given considerable
deference and adhered to except in the most extreme
circumstances—circumstances not present here.105 Indicating as
much, every challenge to amateurism under the Sherman Act since
the Board of Regents ruling has failed.106
Additionally, the district court’s claim that the industry of
college sports has changed a great deal in the last thirty years is not
persuasive. The court appears to be concerned that the increased
commercialization of athletics over the last thirty years has made
the Board of Regents ruling inapplicable. Although the revenue of
college sports has exploded in recent years, college sports were
already highly commercialized when Board of Regents was
decided.107 The NCAA manages this commercial pressure today as
it did thirty years ago—by maintaining its commitment to its
central amateurism and educational principles. In fact, the
“eligibility rules [which] create the product . . . allow its survival in
the face of commercialized pressures” by separating the students
from commercial exposure.108 As such, the precedent remains
pertinent to this case until the Supreme Court rules otherwise or
Congress acts contrary to the ruling.
B. The O’Bannon Court’s Competitive Balance Ruling Will Result
in a Competitive Advantage for Wealthier Schools
The district court’s ruling that the NCAA’s competitive
balance argument does not justify the challenged restraints, while
105

See United States v. Augustine, 712 F.3d 1290, 1295 (9th Cir. 2013)
(“[C]onsidered Supreme Court dictum is special. We do not treat considered
dicta from the Supreme Court lightly. Rather, we accord it appropriate
deference.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
106
Brief Amici Curiae of American Council on Education, Association of
Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges, and National Association of
Independent Colleges and Universities in Support of Defendant-Appellant and
Reversal at 13–14, O’Bannon, 802 F.3d 1049 (No. 14–16601), ECF No. 20.
107
Brief for the National Collegiate Athletic Association, supra note 18, at
29.
108
McCormack v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 845 F. 2d 1338, 1345
(5th Cir. 1988).
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facially solid, has several anticompetitive cracks.109 The court
reasoned that money currently spent on training facilities and
coaching cancels out the procompetitive effects that the challenged
restraints are claimed to provide. Although it is true that highrevenue schools are already able to spend money on coaches and
training facilities to attract student-athletes, these aspects of
recruiting lack the feature of immediacy. Coaches and facilities are
semi-permanent fixtures—they are not instantly removable and
they often cannot be created or hired in a matter of days.110
Allowing universities greater flexibility to pay student-athletes
adds an aspect of immediate competitive bidding to the recruiting
process.
The ability to bid competitively, while normally a staple of
antitrust law, in this case would allow the wealthier colleges to
quickly react to the scholarship offers of other universities. A
wealthy university, however, is unable to immediately construct a
new training facility to better recruit an athlete suddenly interested
in another school. After the O’Bannon ruling, a wealthier school
will be able to make its initial scholarship offer, knowing that if a
smaller school makes a recruiting push, it now has more room to
raise the amount of money offered to the student-athlete. While
this ability is somewhat mitigated by the cap on the available
scholarship, the likely rise of the cap over time will allow greater
flexibility to this potentially anticompetitive bidding process. As
the Ninth Circuit recognized, there is “little doubt that plaintiffs
will continue to challenge the arbitrary limit imposed . . . until they
have captured the full value of their [name, image, and
likeness].”111 While the existing state of college recruiting may
already hurt the competitive balance, the competitive balance will
be damaged even further as universities are given additional
109

As previously noted, the NCAA focused the majority of its appellate
argument on its amateurism justification. As such, the Ninth Circuit “accept[ed]
the district court’s factual findings that the compensation rules do not promote
competitive balance” without consideration of the NCAA’s original arguments
or those made in its post-trial brief. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1072.
110
Coaches are typically under contract for extended periods of time,
making it difficult and costly to fire one without just cause.
111
O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1079.
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flexibility in their ability to pay student-athletes.
C. Upcoming Litigation: Jenkins v. National Collegiate Athletics
Association112
Jenkins v. National Collegiate Athletics Association is a federal
class action case that was recently filed in the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California and was assigned to the
same judge who ruled on the O’Bannon case, Judge Wilken.113 No
trial date has been set. Plaintiffs Martin Jenkins, Nigel Hayes, and
Anfornee Steward are student-athletes who currently compete at
Division I schools.114 They represent a class consisting of players
in either Division I men’s basketball or football who, at any time
from the date of the Complaint through the date of the final
judgment, received or will receive a written offer for a full
scholarship.115 The defendants consist of the NCAA and the five
major conferences: The Pacific-12, the South Eastern Conference,
the Big Ten, the Big 12, and the Atlantic Coast Conference.116
Plaintiffs allege that the “[d]efendants have entered into what
amounts to cartel agreements with the avowed purpose and effect
of placing a ceiling on the compensation that may be paid to these
athletes for their services.”117 Under current NCAA and power
conference rules, student-athletes may receive financial assistance
only up to the full cost of attendance, in exchange for their
services.118 The plaintiffs claim that the defendants have jointly
conspired and agreed upon this restriction, and that such an
agreement is illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.119
112

In June 2015, Jenkins and two other cases were consolidated into a case
entitled In re: NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation before Judge
Wilken.
113
Amended Complaint-Class Action Seeking Injunction at 1, In Re: Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., No. 4:14-md-02541
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2015), ECF No. 142.
114
Id. at 3–4.
115
Id. at 6.
116
Id. at 1.
117
Id.
118
O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1079.
119
Amended Complaint-Class Action Seeking Injunction, supra note 113,

176

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 11:3

The NCAA and the major conferences are “engaged in the
business of . . . operating major college football and men’s
basketball businesses, including the sale of tickets and telecast
rights.”120 Plaintiffs claim that, absent the challenged restrictions,
the member-schools of each conference would vigorously compete
for the services of certain basketball and football players in order
to best succeed in this business.121 This competition would
allegedly occur upon the removal of the limitations on the
remuneration that players may receive for their athletic services.122
Without a cap, plaintiffs claim that schools would provide
prospective athletes with recruiting inducements and offer to
provide substantial benefits during their tenure as student-athletes,
both of which are subject to significant restrictions by the NCAA
and conference rules.123
As support for their argument, plaintiffs note that memberschools are currently competing against each other for the services
of student-athletes, but within the constraints of the rules
prohibiting financial compensation beyond the price-fixed
limits.124 “[Student-athletes] are so desired that national media
outlets closely track recruitments from as early as freshman year in
high school until National Signing Day.”125 Thousands of high
school students are profiled and many are brought to individual
campuses for a more personal recruitment experience.126
Additionally, plaintiffs note that schools are constantly upgrading
their athletic facilities and arenas to appeal to prospective studentathletes.127
Plaintiffs argue the member-schools’ incomes are so great that
competition would be vigorous and highly beneficial to studentathletes.128 The sixty-five schools in the five power conferences
at 1.

120
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Id. at 9–10.
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reported total revenues of 5.15 billion dollars in 2011–2012.129 A
significant portion of this revenue came from television rights to
broadcast football and basketball games.130 The popularity of the
sports has become so profitable that individual conference
broadcasting contracts have risen as high as three billion dollars.131
Overflowing with cash, restricted from competing for studentathletes, and with economic incentive to field the best team, the
member-schools have directed their resources to the hiring of
coaches and the construction of arenas and training facilities.132
The most relevant difference between the Jenkins suit and the
O’Bannon case is the scope of the challenged restraints. The
O’Bannon Complaint focuses on the restraints preventing the
compensation of student-athletes for the use of their names,
images, and likenesses. Plaintiffs in Jenkins complain that any
restraint on compensation to student-athletes or potential studentathletes has an anticompetitive effect on competition.
D. The O’Bannon Ruling Will Have Devastating Results if Applied
to Jenkins
The NCAA is likely to present the same general justifications
for its stance against compensating student-athletes in Jenkins as it
did in O’Bannon. As Jenkins will be presided over by the same
district court judge, it is very likely that those justifications will be
similarly considered. This section will discuss the effect the
rationale from O’Bannon would have on the Jenkins suit and any
additional arguments in favor of the justifications, in light of the
broad scope of Jenkins.
1. The O’Bannon Court’s Amateurism Ruling Could Make
College Athletes More Similar To Professionals Than Students
The district court and the Ninth Circuit in O’Bannon
acknowledged that the NCAA’s restraints do promote amateurism
129
130
131
132

Id. at 19.
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Id. at 21.
Id. at 19.
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and have some procompetitive value, but found that they did not
justify the challenged restraints.133 In doing so, the courts
questioned the NCAA’s means of maintaining its tradition of
amateurism. The Ninth Circuit found the NCAA’s restraints to be
“patently and inexplicably stricter than is necessary,” despite
finding only an additional eleven percent of the scholarship needed
to be added. While the Ninth Circuit attempted to make it clear that
paying student-athletes a lump sum of money would violate the
procompetitive goal of amateurism,134 the O’Bannon ruling sets
the tone for future cases to make additions to the scholarship cap.
Jenkins presents an opportunity for the court to do just that.
It seems unlikely that the Jenkins court will completely
eliminate the cap on how much student-athletes can be paid, in the
face of the NCAA’s amateurism argument. But if the courts were
to continue to make small increases to the cap and maintain that
the amateurism aspect remains intact, any semblance of the
NCAA’s historical idea of amateurism would disappear. If the cap
were to continue to steadily increase, the amount of money that
could, and likely would, be offered to student-athletes would make
them more similar to professional athletes than amateurs and
students. For example, the fair market value of a Louisville
basketball player in 2012 was 1.5 million dollars per year.135 The
only Louisville player to be drafted into the NBA in the first round
the following year currently makes 1.1 million dollars per year.136
Comparably, this player would have made more as a college
athlete than as a professional, if paid to scale. While it is unlikely
133

O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1072–73,
1079 (9th Cir. 2015).
134
The Ninth Circuit noted that the “difference between offering studentathletes education-related compensation and offering them cash sums . . . is a
quantum leap.” O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1078.
135
Tony Manfred, Here’s How Much Big-Time College Athletes Should Be
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Paid,
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INSIDER
(Mar.
20,
2013),
http://www.businessinsider.com/heres-how-much-college-athletes-are-worth2013-3.
136
Associated Press, Shabazz Muhammad, Gorgui Dieng finalize contracts
with Timberwolves, FOX SPORTS (July 14, 2013), http://www.foxsports.com/nort
h/story/shabazz-muhammad-gorgui-dieng-finalize-contracts-with-timberwolves071413.
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that the cap would be raised that high, the Ninth Circuit
acknowledged that the plaintiffs are going to continue to fight the
arbitrary cap “until they have captured the full value of their
[name, image, and likeness].”137
2. The O’Bannon Court’s Competitive Balance Ruling Could
Allow Colleges To Bid Any Amount for a Student-Athlete
In rejecting the competitive balance justification, the O’Bannon
court reasoned that such a balance would not be affected by
compensating student-athletes because of the immense amount of
money spent on new training facilities and coaches.138 This
rationale could have a devastating effect on competition if applied
to the Jenkins suit and highlights the weaknesses of the O’Bannon
court’s rationale. Premium athletes are likely to receive offers from
many wealthy schools. As the college sports industry has grown,
more schools have built new facilities and paid top-dollar for
coaches, as pointed out in the O’Bannon decision.139 Building a
137

O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1079.
O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 978–79
(N.D. Cal. 2014).
139
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(Aug.
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ATCLID=205912861 (last visited Dec. 15, 2015); Sun Life Stadium Renovations
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2015,
HURRICANESPORTS.COM
(Jan.
20,
2015),
http://www.hurricanesports.com/ViewArticle.dbml?ATCLID=209857165; Lane
Stadium/Worsham Field, HOKIESPORTS.COM, http://www.hokiesports.com/
football/lanestadium.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2015); Bud Elliott, Due to
stadium renovations, Florida State to hold spring game in Orlando Citrus Bowl,
TOMAHAWKNATION.COM (Jul. 6, 2015), http://www.tomahawknation.com/
2015/7/6/8901239/florida-state-spring-game-orlando-citrus-bowl-stadiumrenovation-fsu-football; Memorial Stadium Suite Renovations, CLEMSON TIGERS
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2013),
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state-of-the-art training facility may be a significant recruiting tool
for some athletes, but it will have no competitive advantage for
those athletes who see such buildings at every school they
consider. The only way to compete for those student-athletes
would be to outbid all other schools.
The O’Bannon court capped the amount a student-athlete can
be paid, temporarily mitigating this problem, but the Jenkins suit
aims at eliminating all restrictive caps on paying student-athletes.
While many schools are likely able to afford to pay studentathletes the full cost of attendance, the freedom to bid any amount
could destroy competitive balance. The difference in earnings
between colleges is so vast that the wealthiest group of schools
could easily outbid those with lesser profits. For example, the top
earning school in Division I college basketball for 2014 made
nearly twenty-five million dollars in profit.140 The twenty-fifth
most profitable team earned just over seven million dollars.141 That
is a seventy-two percent drop in profit in twenty-four spots; a
difference that will grow significantly when considering the
discrepancy between the top-earning school and the 200th or 300th
school.142 The ability to bid any amount for the services of a
student-athlete is unlikely to completely overshadow the millions
of dollars spent on coaching and facilities. But with so many
universities building such facilities and hiring notable coaches,
prospective student-athletes are going to have to look elsewhere to
differentiate between schools. The ability of the wealthiest schools
to bid any amount to recruit a student would surely lead to
competitive imbalance.

at Scott Stadium, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA, http://www.virginiasports.com/
facilities/scott-stadium.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2015).
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CONCLUSION
The purpose of antitrust law is to protect the consumer, which
is why certain procompetitive factors can outweigh and justify
anticompetitive restrictions. Both the district court and the Ninth
Circuit in O’Bannon appear to have ignored such procompetitive
justifications in light of the alleged injustice suffered by studentathletes. As such, the courts may have opened the door for the
eventual elimination of the current college sports product. The
Jenkins suit presents a dangerous opportunity for the court to do
just that. If the Jenkins court follows the same rationale that it did
in O’Bannon, despite the larger scope of Jenkins, college sports
may begin to closely resemble professional associations. The
elimination of such a sought-after product would only harm
consumers and is contradictory to the fundamental principles of
antitrust law.
PRACTICE POINTERS


If a favorable Jenkins ruling allows athletes to negotiate
any payment in exchange for attending a certain college,
attorneys who work in sports law, as well as sports agents
(many/most of whom are lawyers), may soon have a new
field of clientele.



A high school student and his parents may need to hire an
attorney for advice on signing with a college and to review
the contract the student will have to sign with the college.
A familiarity with the relevant case law will be essential.
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